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PREFACE 
I went into history because I wished to undertake the 
comparative study of revolutions, and to see if I could 
learn what historians had to say about· revolutions, and not, 
when I came· to do t~is thesis, to discover that I had 
nothing new to contribut·e. I did not wish to overlook 
differences of perspective, such as that of a scientific 
rationalist·and of a revolutionary.marxist. After all, what 
is the use of comparative historiography if all that it does 
for.you is enable you to talk with some plausibility about 
events that changed the world, without also understanding 
how those events were viewed,. and if such understandin.<s 
does not enable you to contribute to the understanding of 
others? 
My understanding of revolutions evolved from first 
reading the classic in comparative study of revolutions, 
The Anatomy of Revolutions, by Crane Brinton, and then· 
reading Eric Hobsbawm's speech, "Revolution," which includes 
four significant claims: 
1. ·rhis· is the epoch of social revolution. 
2 •. Revolutions are inevitable. 
J. Revolutions are uncontrollable. 
4. Revolutionaries are of little historical interest.I 
Hobsbawm's claims are not supported by the bulk of findings 
derived from my understanding of three abortive revolutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Purpose.-
·rhe purpose of this thesis is to desc-ribe and then 
to compare common descriptive characteristics (uniformities) 
evident within three historical events: the Paris Commune of 
1871, the Zapatista Movement of the Mexican Revolution between· 
1910 and 1919, and the Spartacist Rebellion of 1919. One 
such uniformity is the fact that all three are abortive 
social revolutions. 
Of course, the historian must begin with what he finds. 
The fact that some revolutions are abortive refutes the 
universal generalization that all revolutions are successful. 
The semantic usage of the term "revolution" must be 
conside.red. Hobsbawm' s preference for a "steam-boiler" 
analogy of revolution, ·insofar as it fails to support his 
claims, :1.s considered in reference to Brinton's "fevertt 
analogy.2 Hence, a difference in perspective is introduced 
by way of examination of the views of Crane Brinton, a 
scientific rat1onalist3 ,· and of Eric Hobsbawm, a marxist of 
the Old Left.4 
The uniformities drawn from the comparative study of 
the three abortive.revolutions suggest all four of Hobsbawm's 
claims are refutable. Hence, the purpose of this thesis has 
a secondary aim, i.e., the refutation of his four claims. 
History of the Idea of "Revolution" 
1. Astronomic Sense. The term "revolution" was 
originally used in the astr?nomic sense when Copernicus 
in 1543 wrote De revolutionibus orbium caelestium. His use 
of the term explained celestial movements, such as the orbit 
of planets, where motion returns to its starting point. This 
origlnal astronomic ·sense of. the.term "revolution" was later 
applied to socio-political events, since such events seemed 
analogous to the motion of planets •. ~ 
Renaissance historians -- e.g., Guicciardini, Nardi, 
and Machiavelli -- applied the term1 rivoluzione, which is 
the Italian equivalent of the Latin term revolutionibus, to 
events either of political disorder or change in rulership. 
In 166() the English equivalent, "revolution," was used in 
Clarendon's History of the Rebellion when speaking of the 
"many and great revolutions" in the preceding twenty years 
in England. Significantly, the astronomic sense was retained 
in the early use of the· term in English.. Clarendon, for 
example, attributed governmental changes in England to the 
influence of an evil star. Thomas Hobbes also retained the 
astronomic sense -- but without the evil star -- when he 
wrote Leviathan, where he wrote of the governmental ch..anges 
taking place in England: "I have seen in this revolution a 
circular motion of the .sovereign power through two usurpers 
from the late King to his son."6 
2o The Non-astronomic Sense. Herodotus and Thucydides 
knew of course of uprisings against rulers; Plato and 
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Aristotle knew of changes of constitutions; Cicero knew of 
people eager for new things; Polybius and Aristotle knew of 
historical cycles in politi·cal forms; and many of these same 
writers living in pre-Copernican times are often translated 
as having known the non-astronomic sense of the term "revolu-
tion," as in the case of one translator who has Plato obser-
ving in the Republic that 11 revolutions" start wlthin the 
ruling class7 or as in the case of the translator who has 
Aristotle observing in Politics the .-state of mind of those 
who create "revolutions."8 
What is meant whenever the term "revolution" is applied 
to socio-political events in the non-astronomic sense? The 
circularity of motion has.evidently dropped out of what the 
term one~-· had meant in the astronomic sense. What is retained 
whenever the term is applied to socio-political events depends 
solely on the user o·f the semantlc device. As a u..l1.iversal, 
the term "revolution" is a semantic device without any single 
definition. Peter Amann finds that the term needs a re-
definition. Crane Brinton finds that the term has a general 
usage. Indeed, Brinton dismisses the need for an "exact 
definition of 'revolution'" but says he will "cling to the 
general term9," while Eric Hobsbawm defines "revolutionary 
situation" as offering "good chanqes of a revolutionary out-
come. "lo He leaves open. what he would consider "a revolu-
tionary outcome": "Except insofar as 'failure' implies a 
definition of 'success', this leaves the problem of the out-
come of revolutions openo"11 Thus, he leave it open. Also, 
lJ. 
Hobsbawm seems to say that "success" is more than merely the 
establishment of state power or its equivalent. 
Obviously, a reyolutionary situation can have either 
good chances of a revolutionary outcome or not. Only after 
establishment of _-·a state power or its equivalent can those 
chances be assessed as good or bad with any_degree of his-
torical exactitude. Indeed, it is unhistor1c to predict 
whether chances of a revolutionary outcome are good or bad. 
Hence, Hobsbawm is not too helpful in arriving at a conoise 
definition of the concept of revolution. 
In contras·t, Crane Brinton, who deals w1 th the Paris 
Commune of 1871 as an "abortive"·revolution, is historical 
and therefore more helpful. For example, he says, "By 
abortive is meant simply the failure of organized groups in 
revolt." Slnce the three revolutions to be considered failed 
to establish state power or its equivalent, the term "abor-
tive" applies to all three cases. 
The Communards under such leaders like Gustave Flourens, 
the Zapatistas under the leadership of Emiliano Zapata, and 
the Spartacists under leaders like Rose Luxemburg each as an 
organized group failed to overthrow the respective incumbent 
governments and then to establish their own state power or 
its equivalent. How did they fail? In each case the cause 
was similar: 1.e., the respective incumbent governments used 
effective force to smash each insurgent group. Part of that 
use of effective force was the assassination of the respec-
tive insurgent leaders mentioned above. 
B. Revolution to a Scientific Rationalist. 
Historians need conceptual schemes in order to ulnder-
stand revolutions.· Crane B~inton's conceptual scheme is 
that .of a scientific rationalist with a detached disposition. 
His classic study, The Anatomi of Revolution, ·has the modest 
aim of attempting to establish, "as a scientist might• 
certain first approximations of uniformites to be noted in 
the course of four successful revolutions in modern states.•~2 
In contrast~ this study· analyzes three unsuccessful modern 
revolutions. 
Brinton finds one relevant uniformity in all four 
successful revolutions he compares: the respective·rulers 
did not use . force effe~t 1 vely. He says, the' "determined use 
of force on the part of the government might prevent the 
mounting excitement from culminating in an overthrow of the 
government~u But "in all four their attempt was a failure.n13 
In contrast, in all three abortive revolutions here studied 
the incumbent government did effectively use force. Part of 
the determined use of force of all three r·espective incumbent 
governments was the use of assassination of insurgent leaders. 
The ·common uniformity of assassination may become the pattern 
in the future to effectivel! control revolutionary situations. 
The theme that Brinton stresses is that of understanding 
14 
revolutions in order to protect ourselves against them. He 
finds a parallel between understanding thunderstorms and 
understanding revolutions: 1.e., in both cases steps can be 
taken to protect ourselves against them. 
6 
In order to understand how to protect ourselves from 
revolutions, if that is our intention, Brinton offers the 
conceptual scheme of a scientific rationalist, who uses 
inductive facts that are empirically verifiable about pheno-
-
mena·to support tentative hypotheses. He aims at establish-
ing first approximations of uniformities.by comparing the 
course of four revolutions, i.e, the American, English, French, 
and Russian reyolutions. This thesis has a similar aim: 1.e,, 
to analyze the common descriptive characteristics (uniformi-
ties) by comparing the course of three abortive revolutions. 
J 
Some historians draw the distinction between science, 
which deals ·-with approximate uniformi tes that are similar and 
therefore not unique,.and history, which deals they claim 
-- with human events that are un1.que. Brinton rejects this 
distinction. He says, "the doctrine of absolute uniqueness 
of events in history seems nonsense.»15 Since uniformities 
are limited generalizations, it would seem to follow that 
uniformi~ies are types of common characteristics. Thus, 
specific, particular characteristics of events are typical, 
i.e., insofar as particular events are similar and therefore 
of a type, they are''not unique. 
A specific revolution may at first seem to be singu-
larly unique in all particulars, but these same type of 
particularities lose their uniqueness when compared to 
similar particularities common to other revolutions upon 
comparison. Such uniformities, however, ought to retain 
the limitations of the inductively drawn generalizations. 
1. 
' 
' 
c. Revolution to a Marxist of the Old Left. 
In August 197 5,. Eric Hobsbawm spoke on "Revolution" 
. . 
at the Fourteenth International Congress of Historical 
Sciences. Although he does not claim professional expertise 
in the fields of marx1st ideas and of the history of revolu-
tions and revolutionary movements, he is regarded ~enerally· 
as a marxist of the Old Left. Since t~e concluding arguments 
in this thesis attempt to refute four claims that he makes in 
his speech, the stress will be on elaboratiQ.n of those 
claims. This attempt at refutation of his claims is second• 
a~y.. But it will help to understand revolutione.:ry 'chances •. 
Hobsbawm's four claims are basically the [ollowing: 
1. This is the epoch of social revolution. 
2. To accept this as the epoch of social revolution 
is to recognize that revolutions are· inevitable. 
J. These revolutions are uncontrollable. 
4. Revolutionary personality is of little historical· 
interest. 
Retaining the same numbers as the claims, he states them as 
follows in the more extended elaboration of context: 
1. Historical analysis of modern times as an "epoch 
of social revolution" is profitable. · 
1. We are following Marx, who "provided the most 
powerful guide to revolution," which nwe may call the 
macro-phenomenon ~·of 'an epoch of social revolution.'" 
1, 2,3. To accept Marx's analysis of modern period as 
"an epoch of social revolution" 1s "to recognize that at· 
certain periods specific kinds of drastic historical change 
are inevitable, and that therefore historic forces beyond 
the control of will, must 'break asunder the integum•- of · 
the old systems •••• " 
2. 11 ••• there can be no serious dispute that some func-
tionally revolutionary changes have been inevitable, some _ 
.actual revolutions a.voidable, because avoided, •••• " 
2. " ••• his (Marx's) beliaf."in the inevitability of vio-
lent revolutions was qualified - he allowed for the possibil-
ity of a peaceful transition in some countries •••• " 
2. It is a disadvantage 0 to assume that no revolution 
is in the long run inevitable." 
2. & 3. "I specifically wish to disclaim as unhistori-
cal any version of the view that 'revolution is always 
avoidable if •••• t" 
J. " ••• changes by revolution are likely to be ••• (ini-
tially) ·.:more uncontrollable, •••• " 
). "This (Lenin's analysis of the revolutionary situa-
tion) suggests that a revolut1onary situation is not a crisis 
controllable, at least from within, by deliberate policy or 
•crisis-management', being characterised by relative uncon-
trollability ... 
3. ,.I agree with Dahrendorf who rightly finds the 
analogy of the steam-boiler more illuminating than Brinton's 
'fever' (analogy)" 
4. " ••• though approaches which seek to identify ••• 
•revolutionary personality' are of little historical interest, 
• • • • nl6 
These statements can be restated in different ways, but the 
four claims are basically reducible to the paraphrasing above. 
Only an extended argument will refute these four claims. 
But such an argument can be here simply put as foilows: The 
assassination of key insurgent leaders with a high level of 
control over both the insurgent movement and the revolution-
ary situation has greatest impact on changing the.course of 
history and in particular controlling the revolutionary situa-
tion. In order to determine the amount· of impact of the 
assassination of a particular revolutionary personality, the 
historian has no recourse but to show more than a little 
interest in the revolutionary personality. Assassination 
plots in defense of the state presume that the revolutionary 
situation can be controlled (and sometimes avoided, if pre-
dicted) by the use of determined effective force. Any 
revolutionary situation that is controlled or avoided proves 
that revolutions can be controlled and therefore are not 
inevitable. Examples of abortive revolutions refute the 
claim that all. revolutions are inevitable. Indeed, during 
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a revolutionary situation-~ i.e., one that has the possibi-
lity of a.revolutionary outcome -- it is unhistoric to speak 
of those possibilities before they occur. Only after the 
revolutionary outcome can Hobsbawm or any historian speak 
of the historical inevitability of the chances of success. 
Most of Hobsbawm•s notions are -- e.g., "inevitable," 
"chances," "outcome," and "success!' -- future-bound possi-
bilities which are blatantly unhistoric. 
Consider, for ·example, the claim that any successful 
revolution is uncontrollable. The success of a revolution 
cannot be forecasted with any degree of historical exactitude. 
To claim that all successful revolutions are inevitable also 
cannot be asserted with any degree of historical exactitude. 
To define revolutionary situation in unhistoric, future- . 
bound terms is to reduce the concept of revolution to the 
semantic games that historians play: 1.P:, a revolution is 
· successful when state power is established or its equiva-
lent, but only after it is established, while a revolution is 
controlled -- if it is ever controlled by the incumbent state 
power by the effective use of force -- before its equivalent 
is .established. Hence, the claim that any successful (future-
bound) revolution is uncontrollable (past-bound) is self-con-
tradic~ory, because a given ~evolution cannot be both in the 
future and in the past at the same time. 
The term "avoidable" makes Hobsbawm self-refuting: 
10 
All social revolutions are unavoidable. 
Some social revolutions are not unavoidable. 
No social revolution is avoidable. 
Some· social revolutions are avoidable. 
The former is an example a particular negative proposition 
opposed to its general positive counterpart. Hobsbawm does 
claim that.social revolutions are uncontrollable and 1nevit-
able. But he refuted himself by also suggesting that some 
revolutions are avoidable, 1.e., not unavoidable. And the 
latter is an example of a particular positive proposition 
opposed to its general negative counterpart. Hobsbawm, it 
must again be pointed out, does claim that social revolutions 
are uncontrollable and inevitable, which is to say that no 
social revolution is controllable and not inevitable. But 
his claims are again refuted by his own suggestion that some 
revo·lut1.ons are avoidable. 
The introduction of the term "successful" is in keeping 
with Hobsbawm's own understanding of revolution. A revolution 
is either a failure or a success. But it cannot be considered 
a failure unless "success" is de:fined: "Except insofar as 
'failure' implies a definition of •success'," Hobsbawm says, 
"this leaves the problem of the outcome of revolutions open." 
He goes on to say, 
Obviously the establishment and maintenance of state 
power or its equivalent is a minimum condition of success, 
but success is more than this unless the objects and functions 
of a revolution are defined merely as the ·establishment of 
state power where previously none existed •••• 
Thus, when he speaks of revolutions as inevitable, he is 
speaking of successful revolutions as being inevitable. 
CHAPTER I 
DESCRIPrION OF THREE ABORTIVE REVOLUTIONS 
A. The Paris Commune of 1871. 
The Paris Commune of 1871 -- not to be confused wit.h 
the Paris Commune of 1793 and· the Paris Commune of 1848 --
is regarded by Karl Marx, v.r. Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg 
as the best model of a proletarian revolution that estab-
lished a·programme for working-class political power. As 
an abortive revolution the Paris c·ommune of 1871 is also 
a practical model for anti-marxists ·concerned in protecting 
the state's monopoly of power. 
The following description of the Paris Commune will 
stress the revolutionary personality of Gustave Flourens. 
Related to his personality as a leader of the Paris Commune 
is the death sentence in absentia issued by the incumbent's 
military court, which provides· the sort· of evidence needed 
to prove that the incumbent government considered Flourens 
a key insurgent leader of the Paris Commune. His later 
capture and assassination after leading one of the major 
Communard assaults against Versailles must be seen in 
relation to the anti-Com..~unard myth created by the incumbent 
government in terms of the moral righteousness of the 
determined use of force; including assassination. 
The opportunity for the rise of the Paris Commune 
occurred when Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's liberal Empire was 
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cut short by losing the Franco-Prussian War of 1870~ . He had 
suffered three defeats in six days· in August of 1870, when 
demonstrations broke out in Paris against his Empire. On 
September 2, 1870, he surrendered himself and his .army. With 
the collapse of the Republic in the person of Napoleon III, 
there no longer existed a legitimate government to rule. On 
September ~' insurrectionary demonstrations broke out in Paris. 
That night a Central Committee -- dominated by flourens and 
17 
other revolutionary personalities -- began.considering 
elections, national defense, and provisioning of the city. 
Jules Favre, foreign minister for the Government of 
National Defense, spoke to Bismarck, who would not negotiate 
with a government which did not represent the whole of France. 
The group led by Favre sought peace, while the republican· 
insurgents in Paris prepared to defend Paris against the 
Prussians, who completely encircled Paris by September 18, 
the beginning of a long siege that was to unite Parisians. 
Meanwhile, Favre and Ad61phe Thiers, on behalf of the 
·incumbent .. government, prepared to seek an armistlceo 
During the· months of the siege, the Pa.r1s National 
Guard made several abortive revolutionary attempts to over-
throw the provisi'onal government. The Central Committee of 
the Twenty Arrondissements (iee., neighborhood power centers 
or communes, which are forerunners of the Soldiers' and the 
Workers' Councils -- or "soviets" -- of the Russian Revolution 
and of the German Revolution of 1918) 1ssu~d a pro-repub-
11can ttRed Poster" on January 7, 1871, seeking t;o replace 
I 
I 
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the provisional government with a Paris Commune. 
On January 28, the provisional government finally 
signed an armistice with the newly proclaimed German Empire 
under Bismarck. The signing of the armistice gave Favre and 
Thiers a favorable role in French politics, especially 
the elections to a National Assembly, which designated 
Thiers as 0 Head of the Executive Power." 
Reaction to the pro-monarchist National Assembly was 
. . . 
to again unify Parisians. The International, the Federation 
of Trade Unions, and the Delegation of the Twenty Arron-
dissements sought working-class polltical power and worker 
ownership of means of production, if they ever gained control 
of Paris. 
On March 10, the National Assembly transferred its 
seat to Versailles and then passed several decrees, each 
of which angered Parisians. It ended the mo:ratori.um on 
rents and payment of commercial bills; it abolished pay for 
members of the National Guard; and it suspended six pro-
republican newspapers. ·And a military court directed that 
Flourens, one o~ the two most popular revolutionary leaders, 
receive a death sentence in absentia._18 
By March 17, Thiers, seeking the respect of the Germ.ans 
as well as the rest of France, sought to demonstrate his 
government's control over Paris. He sent troops to Paris 
with the orders to seize the National Guard's cannon. But 
the troops bungled their orders and Parisians soon gathered 
and fraternized with them. "A mob brought together by 
i 
I 
! 
i · 
chance;J.9 that morning murdered two of Thiers' generals, 
Lecomte and Cl~ment-Thomas. Neither the National Guard, 
14: 
nor the Central Committee, were responsible for the murders. 
Nevertheless, Thiers and the National Assembly propagated 
the myth that these crimes were deliberate acts of the 
National Guard in defiance of the "le.gal". government of 
France, although as soon as Thiers made the fateful. decision 
on March 18·to withdraw all regular troops and government 
officials from Paris to Versailles, Paris suddenly lacked 
a "legal" government. 
Parisians were first enraged;by Thiers' attempt to 
take thei.r cannon -- because the cannon in question had been 
paid for by public subscriptions and they considered them not 
state property but their own -- and then surprised by Thiers' 
abandonment of Paris. All the talk in Paris was of the pro-
vocation of Thiers. A political vacuum had been created in 
Paris, which was now lacking a "legal" government. Auguste 
Vacquerie, who was Victor Hugo's son-in-law and a pro-repub-
lican dramatist, used the funeral of Hugo's son, who had been 
killed in the Franco-Prussian War, as the occasion to pro-
claim the democratic social Republic. And soon barricades 
. ~ 
were up everywhere in Paris and the red flag flew over the 
Hotel de Ville tower.20 
A Paris Commune was declared. And soon communes were 
proclaimed in Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Narbonne, St. 
Etienne, Le Creusot, and Limoges. Thus, Paris was not an 
isolated centre of republican sentiment. 
15 
Members to the Paris Commune were elected on March 26. 
Its membership has been carefully analyzed by historians 
with great interest in order.to identify whether th~ Paris 
Commune' s revolutionary personalities were prolet.arian, 
since the 0 socialist myth" holds that the pro-republican 
programme of the democratic social Republic was pro-working 
class. The proletarian political power base of the Commune 
can be considered a practical model, if its membership can 
be identified as working class.. Of the membership, ·17 
members were of the International, 13 of the Central Com-
mittee· of the National Guard, 8 members of Blanquists, 10 
" 
members -- including Gustave Flourens -- of the Radical Press 
and Revolutionary Party, 21 members of the Clubs, and 15 
members of the bourgeoisie, who did not sit or else res1gned. 
The Communards numbered 100,000 and the elected members 
listed above were the Commune's leadership. 21 . 
One of the first acts of the Commune was .to renew 
.war-time moratoriums on rents and extend payment of commer-
cial bills. The next act was an anti-cleric decree that 
separated Church from State. Later acts included giving 
to the workers the means of production, 1.e., vacant shops. 
And a "Declaration'' of the Commune proclaimed its intentions: 
••• Paris and the entire nation must be informed of the 
character, the motives and the aims of the revolution that 
is taking place at this moment1 it must be known that those 
who are ultimately responsible .for our sorrows, our suffer-
ings and our misfortunes are the same who, after betraying 
France and delivering Paris to foreigners, proceed to 
destroy the capital with a blind and merciless determination, 
so that the two-fold evidence of their betrayal and their 
crime may perish with the downfall of the Republic and of 
freedom.22 
i. 
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The Communards themselves in the midst of a revolution 
blamed all the sufferings of Parisians on Versailles, which 
was depicted as mercilessly determined to destroy Paris. 
Of the Commune's elected leadership, Gustave Flourens 
was regarded as a high-minded radical revolutionary with 
Jacobin sentiments. He was not, ho~ever, a proletarian, 
because he was independently wealthy. Yet he had been 
elected to the Commune from the Twentieth Arrondissement. 
The fact that the Versailles' military court had singled 
him out, along with.Blanqui; _to be sentenced to death in 
absentia -- since he had been one of the major revolution-
aries in the earlier insurrections in 1870 -- made him a 
hero to the Commune. A measure of his role as Communard 
leader is seen again when he led the abortive sortie of 
April 3, 1871, against Versailles. It was one of the first 
and last attempts to overthrow with force the Versailles 
government.. Since he had been condemned to death and since 
he was captured during the sortie, it comes as no surprise 
that the political murder of Flourens thereafter took place. 
Flourens had gone to battle against an adversary with 
all the ardor of great heroes. After his assassination, 
l · the Communards had a martyr in the person of Flourens. 
Thereafter, Thiers prepared to attack- Paris with 
loyal troops. Bismarck gave him captured French troops. 
On May 21, 1871, Thiers' troops breached the walls of Paris. 
From May 21 to 28 street fighting took place. · Between 
15,000 and J0,000 Parisians were killed. Thousands were 
later deported. In order to support the. moral righteous-
ness of the assassination of Flourens, the slaughter of 
Communards and their sympathizers, and mass deportations . 
. to New Caledonia, Th~ers flooded F!ance.with misleading 
pamphlets which slandered the dead. Thus, a "reactionary 
myth" was created that aimed at propagating an ant1-
1nsurgent climate ·1n France in order to restore law and 
order. 
17 
Pro-Communard socialists propagated a "socialist myth" 
of the Paris Commune, which became the model for marxists. 
P . 23 One historian has found three myths of the aris Commune: 
(1) The reactionary one, successfully launched by Thiers 
even before the Commune was elected; this myth links Blanqui 
with Buonarotti and Babeuf of the last revolution of the 
French Revolution and accuses 1 t of being the instr~nt of 
communists of the International and atheists, whose attacks 
on both property and the Church were labeled deplorablee (2) 
The socialist one, supported by Marx and later Lenin, em-
phasizes the spontaneous and popular nature of· the Commune, 
e.g., rather than a premeditated outbreak; this myth links 
the International and.believers in the Communist Manifesto 
-- with its programme for the Revolutions of 1848·-- to the 
Communards and their proletarian programme. And (3) the 
revolutionary one, inspired by Lissagaray' s famous his.tory, 
Commune of 18Zl (which was translated by Marx's daughter) 
and the memory of Charles Delescluze, who was killed on the 
last barricades as a 1793 republican. 
i 
I 
~ . 
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... 
Certainly one of the roles of a historian must be that· 
of an iconoclast, since only historical fact can break the 
fabricated myth. Consider the "socialist" myth which almost 
romanticizes the Paris Commune. Crane Brinton says that 
"The Paris Commune of 1871 i~ an abortive social, though 
hardly socialist, revolution. 024 Karl Marx in 1881 said that 
" ••• the majority of the Commune was in no sense Socialist •••• ,25 
In order for the "socialist" myth to hold, the members Of the 
elected officers had to be socialist workingmen, but "The 
majority· or the elected officers consisted not of workingmen 
but of journalists, . club orators, ~nd.:what Marx himself 
called 'shouters.• 026 And the International, which was 
socialist, was not marxist. One delegate, Leo Frankel, was 
the only marxist in the French·section of the·Inte~national. 
Since "the majority of the leaders of the Paris Commune were 
not members of the French Section of the Internat.iona1,r•27 
the historian must look elsewhere for the possibility of 
justifying the myth that the Communards were "socialist.n 
The National Guard might be considered the only possibility· 
of a majG'.rity of workingmen. But "There is no real evidence 
extant that the majority of the National Guard consisted of 
wo~kingmen, although this is not unlikely, given the nature 
of the Paris population, the large numbers of unemployed, 
and the guaranteed pay. 0 28 
Nevertheless, v.r. Lenin in State and Revolution calls 
the Paris Commune "the first attempt of a proletarian revolu-
tion to break !!.Ethe bourgeois state machinery •••• 1129 
; . 
i 
. 
And official Soviet views generally agree with I. Stepanov 
who wrote in Parizhskaya Kommuna (Moscow) in 1921 that the 
Paris Commune "was socialis.t because the proletariat can 
fight for no other gause than Socialism."30 
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Much of course is made of the correspondence between 
Marx and Frankel, the jewelry worker. Since Frankel both 
knew Marx and was a member of the French section of the 
Internation~l, a degree of believability is given the 
ttsocialist" myth. Moreover, the "reactionary" myth feeds 
on the acceptance of the "socialist'' myth, because Thiers 
claimed that the Paris Commune. was ·a "redtt revolution. 
After the fall of the Commune, many Communards left 
France ·ror England, where they met Marx and some became 
what could be termed "marxists. 0 Lissagaray, however, was 
too autonomous a revolutionary personality to be the 
follower of Marx. Lissagaray, visiting the Marx household, 
formed an attachment with Eleanor Marx, who spent some of 
her time -- when not flirting with Lissagaray -~ trans-
lating 500 pages of his present-tense history from French 
to English.31 
Lissagaray's evaluation of Gustave Flourens included: 
Flourens, chief .of the 6Jrd battalion, but who was 
the real commander of Belleville, coul4 no longer res·train 
himself. With the head and heart of a child, an ardent 
imagination, guide_fu by his own impulse, Flourens. conducted 
his battalions •••• 
Obviously Flourens must be considered almost a revolutionary 
hero, since nothing could restrain him in conducting his 
insurgent leadership role, which was guided by autono~y. 
i 
. . 
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An autonomous revolutionary personality is not controllable 
from without because he does not recognize any legitimacy 
of authority. The ardent spirit of such a leader is more 
like a "fever" than a steam-boiler. (Indeed, a steam-boiler 
is controllable. A "fever" is a healthy s.tate of either the 
state or the individual. But with understanding a "fever" 
can be cured. A.fever usually takes a period of time to 
cure, while a steam-boiler can be controlled instantly and 
continuously.) 
In·order for Eric Hobsbawm to find the "steam-boiler" 
analogy more "right •t. than Crane Brinton' s ''fever" analogy, 
the ·~steam-boiler" analogy must correlate with his four 
claims. How is a revolution like a ''steam-boiler"? In the 
mechanical sense, the steam-boiler is instantly and contin-
ually controllable. If revolutionary sit·uations are not 
controllable as· Hobsbawm claims, then the "steam-boiler•• 
analogy does not support his claim, because it is indeed 
controllable. If a revolution is not initially controllable., 
then a "steam-boiler" must be initially uncontrollable, which 
is not the case • 
Moreover, Eric Hobsbawm's claim that approaches that 
seek to identify.revolutionary personality are of little 
historical interest does not serve the historical need to 
show evidence as to whether the Paris Commune was "socialist" 
or "proletarian." The historian must seek the evidence 
needed to adequately support his ela1m with such an approach •. 
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B. The Mexican Revolution and Zapata between 1910 and 1919. 
In order. to describe the Zapatista Movement (i.e., 
the guerrilla movement of the peasants in Morelos, south of 
Mexico City, led by Emiliano Zapata), it is necessary to 
describe other revolutionary events in the north. The stress 
will be placed on key revolutionary leaders, the habits of 
obedience of Zapatistas to Zapata and of V1111stas to Villa 
-- rather than to the federal government -- and the 
plurality of political murders (i.e., assassinations) during 
the Mexican Revolution. 
\ I 
In September 1910 Mexicans celebrated their lOOth year 
of independence. September was also the 80th birthday of 
Mexico's dictator, Porfirio D!az, who had ruled for 30 years. 
During D!az's dictatorship, he had brought both stability and 
material prosperity to Mexicoo His generals and· judges were 
rich, fat, relaxed, and old. Landowners, clergy, army, 
intelligentsia, and even bandit chiefs -- i.e., all possible 
opposition to his rule -- were converted into followers of 
the dictator. 
Bandits were hunted down and given the choice of either 
joining D!az or dying. Those who did not surrender were 
pursued and then killed by the very bandits who had accepted 
government pardons. Thus, peace was achieved by making the 
bandit the symbol of authority in Mexico .33 
All segments of society, except the Indian peasants, 
were considered vital to D!az's monopoly of power. For 
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the loyalty of .the army was assured by allowing generals 
unlimited opportunities for graft, including haciendas as 
gifts, collecting pay for regiments where only platoons 
existed, and granting of concessions for gaming houses and 
brothels. Even ~he loyalty of the Catholic Church was 
ensured by granting them universal influence over the Indian 
population as well as access to great wealth and power as 
landlord, banker, and trustee. In return, the Church 
preached obedience to D!az. 
Thus, D!az was almost without opposition. He announced · 
that he favored political opposition in the presidential 
election of 1910. One candidate, Francisco Madero, a member 
of a rich, landowning family in northern Mexico, presumed 
that the elections would be free. Since his campaigning in 
Sonora brought out large crowds, he was arrested ~nd jailed 
until after the elections. Then the results were announced: 
196 votes for Madero and millions for D!az. 
Madero, after his release,·denounced the.election as 
a fraud in his famous "Plan of San Luis Potos!," which 
launched the Mexican Revolution. Pascual Orozco and Pancho 
Villa in the north and Emiliano Zapata in the south answered 
this call to revolution against the dictatorship of D!az. 
But Madero soon found that he could not control Orozco and 
Villa. Orozco, with 1500 effectives under his command, felt 
that Juarez, a city near the United States-Mexico border,-
could be taken with nothing but a rifle and two cannon.34 
When Madero rejected the plan, Orozco with Villa's compliance 
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had their revolutionaries exchange insults and then shots with 
the federal troops on May 8, 1911. Soon the .battle was im-
possible to stop, as the reyolutionaries dynamited their way 
from one building.to another until the city surrendered. The 
federal loss of Juarez to insurgents shook Mexico and encour-
aged the Zapatistas to seize Cuau~la, just south of Mexico 
City. On May 21, 1911, the Zapatistas occupied Cuernavaca, 
the capital of the state of Morelos, and soon federal troops 
were retreating from Morelos. And.on May 24, rumors circu-
lated throughout Mexico City that D!az would soon re$1gn. As 
crowds gathered, D!az did resign and boarded a German ship 
sailing for Europe. 
D!az gave Madero the battle, but deprived him of winning 
the war. Thus, Madero's victory was incompl~te.35 He would 
not be able to consolidate the D!az bureaucracy and army 
into a revolutionary programme, partly because those govern-
ment structures were still wholly intact and partly because 
those structures would soon be undermining whatever govern-
ment and agrarian reforms he had intended in his "Plan of 
San Luis Potos!." 
The provisional incumbent government was led by De la 
Barra, not Madero. De la Barra appointed Juan Carreon, the 
manager of the Bank of Morelos, to.the office of provisional 
·governor of MorelosQ Carreon sided with the hacendados (i.e., 
the hacienda owners) against the villagers and peasants. The 
first day Madero arrived victoriously in Mexico City, June 8, 
1911, and again on August 13, 1911, Zapata asked that Carre~n 
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be replaced by a revolutionary governor favoring agrarian 
reforms. Meanwhile, Carreon and hacendados disseminated 
.fabricated accounts of depredations in Morelos by Zapatistas. 
These accounts led De la Barra to order General Victoriano 
Huerta to press the campaign~into Morelos either to elimin-
ate or to disperse the Zapatistas. Thus, instead of with-
drawing federal troops, as Zapata requested of Madero on 
August 13, i911, Carreon's exaggerated accounts of chaos in 
Morelos had the opposite effect on De la Barra, who used the 
accounts to justify reinforcing fe~eral t~oops. 
Madero was·1naugurated on November 6, 1911. Instead of 
withdrawing federal troops, he.offered to absolve Zapata of 
the charge of rebellion in return for unconditional surrender 
and exile from Morelos •. The hacienda Madero offered him was 
rejected: Zapata opposed hacendados and did not seek to be 
one. Ultimately, his response to Madero was the famous Plan 
of Ayala, which demanded popular government and agrarian reform. 
As General Huerta pressed the fight against the Zapatis-
tas, the hacendados saw their homes burned, their .haciendas 
taken over and subdivided by peasants (i.e., their lands re-
distributed), animals stolen (i.e., redistributed), their 
families killed, and towns razed. Where prosperty (for a few) 
had earlier existe~, desolation reigned {for the hacendados, 
at least). ·rheir anti-Zapatista myth continued as the press 
slandered the Zapatistas by claiming they were guilty of 
"rape, rapine, pillage, and bri,gandage. 11 36 The citizens of 
Mexico City read only what the hacendado press propagated. 
By the end of 1911, Orozco, bribed by rich cattle 
barons in the north, revolted against Madero also. Madero 
gave the job of running down Orozco to General Huerta, who 
was assisted by Pancho Villa. Orozco's loyalty to Madero 
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had been freely given and therefore freely withdrawn. But 
Huerta and Villa disputed over a horse and Madero intervened. 
Huerta had ordered Villa shot, but Madero saved v1i1a•s 11fe~7 
Huerta was not to forgive Madero for intervening, because 
soon the tide had turned against Madero. The Zapatistas 
by October, 24, 1911, had succeeded in assaulting M1lpa 
Alta, just outside Mexico City, with several thousand 
insurgents. By May 22, 1912, Huerta, who had succeeded in 
capturing Rellano from some 8,000 poorly organized Oroz-
quitas, was no longer interested in being loyal to Madero. 
In October of 1912 Felix D!az, the nephew of the former 
dictator, revolted, but even after his capture and imprison-· 
ment, he was able to conspire to revolt again. 
Felix D!az was aided by General Bernardo Reyes in 
plotting against Madero in 1913, when officers from the 
army freed Felix D!az and marched on the National Palace 
in what is commonly called the "Ten Tragic Days... They 
were met by burst of machine gun;~ fire, which killed Reyes 
and 200 others. Madero, sealing his own doom, called on 
General Huerta to command the palace troops. 
Meanwhile, Henry Lane Wilson, the u.s. Ambassador, 
sought to use his influence to bring order to Mexico. He 
• I 
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conv.inced several foreign diplomats .and Mexican senators that 
Madero ought to resign and General Huerta ought to form a 
military dictatorship. Huerta took Madero into custody and 
then Madero was assassinated. Huerta proclaimed himself 
provisional president. 
The conservative governor of Coahuila, Venustiano 
Carranza, denounced Huerta after the assassination of Madero. 
Soon Carranza's righteous cause found supporters: the forces 
under Alvaro Obregon in Sonora; Villa and Pablo Gonzalez in 
the north; and Zapata, who had b~en an ant1-Huert1sta since. 
as early as August of 1911, in the south. The most ardent 
anti-Hueristas were Villa and Zapata. Huerta sought and 
got the loyalty of Orozco, who made five demands, including 
federal pay for his irregulars. Having met with success 
with Orozco, Huerta sent negotiators to Z~pata with the same 
conditions for an alliance, but Zapata would never ally with 
Huerta. 
Huerta, fearing that governors might ally with 
Governor Carranza, began replacing them one by one. But 
this policy backfired and inadvertently drove ex-governors 
and their supporters into arms against Huerta. Perhaps 
Huerta would have been able-to direct sufficient military 
force against the Constitutionalists under Carranza in the 
three northern states and next against the Zapatistas in 
Morelos to effect an overwhelming victory -- and thereby 
brought peace and order to Mexico that Ambassador Wilson 
had envisioned -- if it had not been for isolated rebellions 
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breaking out in thirteen other states by the summer of 1913. 
Each insurgent outbreak drew strength in troops and demanded 
more supplies. 
Huerta sent General Robles, a Huertista career officer, 
into Morelos in May 1913. Robles arrested and expelled the 
anti-Huertista governor and legislators of Morelos. He then 
razed villages suspected of harboring Zapatist~s, took 
hostages and sometimes executed them, and herded thousands 
into resettlement camps in other states. Robles, however, 
soon found out that he could control only the larger towns. 
Zapata was master of rural Morelos ... 
By late September 1913, Villa began a vigorous cam-
paign in the north, where he forced a federal surrender at 
Torreon, taking 116 valuable artillery pieces, and executing 
all captured federal officers. This defeat stunned Huerta, 
who re·signed. Then Carranza made an attempt to rid himself 
of Villa, who became enraged. Villistas were loyal to Villa 
first and only then loyal to the Constitutionalist Movement~8 
Carranza, since he had been a governor under D!az and 
was pro-hacendado, was not the sort of ruler that either 
Villa or Zapata would obey. Rende, neither Villa in the 
north nor Zapata in the south would consider Carranza the 
legitimate provisional president. Thus, Carranza -- like 
Madero and Huerta before him -- failed to end the revolution. 
Meanwhile, Obregon convinced Carranza to leave the 
forming of a new Mexican government to a Convention at 
Aguascalientes. In October 1914, delegates there soon 
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discovered that Villa was boss. Indeed, Eulalio Gutierrez, 
the provisional president elected by the Convention, found 
himself a virtual prisoner of Villa's. But Gutierrez soon 
escaped to Carranza, who was in Vera Cruz·. Villa entered 
·Mexico City with his troops in December 1914 and sent word 
to Zapata to join him there. Villa, the fat revolutionary, 
and Zapata, the trim· revolutionary, met. The Villistas had 
supported the Plan of Ayala at the Convention, so the two 
insurgent leaders were in agreement as to their revolution-
ary aims: popular governm~nt and agrarian reform. However, 
the Mexican Revolution was not to e·nd in December of 1914. 
Carranza sent federal troops under Obreg6n to drive 
Villa from Mexico City. The Villistas retreated and on 
April 6, 1915, Obregon defeated Villa at Celaya, where 
12,000 lives were lost. WLth Villa on ~he run to the north, 
Carranza turned his attention to Zapata. By late summer 
1916, Carranza sent General Pablo Gonzalez into Morelos 
with 40,000 troops. These troops tortured and mutilated 
and executed unarmed peasants. They raped women, sacked 
towns, burned villages, deported natives to other parts of 
Mexico, and destroyed crops, animals, and implements of work. 
All civil guarantees were suspended.39 
Zapata had to refine his guerrilla tactics. He laid 
traps and ambushes, cut supply lines, stormed towns, and 
generally destroyed small federal units and harassed larger 
federal forces. Whenever Gonzalez divided his forces, he 
exposed them to ambush and assaults. 
. I 
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In June and August of 1916 Carrancistas killed 466 men, 
women, and children in Tlaltizapan, Morelos, where Zapata 
had his headquarters. The .Carrancistas returned again in 
1917 and 1918 to raid Morelos, killing peasants, burning 
crops, driving off cattle, spreading misery and hunger. The 
federal troops even destroyed the sugar mills by carrying_ 
off the mill machinery to Mexico City, where they sold it 
for scrap iron. Of the 70,000 Zapatistas with Zapata in 
1915, only 10,000 remained by 1919.4o 
One of Gonzalez's officers, Jesus Guajardo, was out 
to get the reward being offered for .the head of Zapata. He 
simulated desertion from the federal army by attacking his 
own fellow Carrancistas in Jonacatepec. When Zapata heard 
of the desertion, he sought out his new ally, because to 
Zapata with a dwindling force more allies were needed. 
On April 10, 1919, Guajardo ambushed Zapata. He and 
his men riddled the body of Zapata with bullets when Zapata 
entered the hacienda Chinameca at Guajardo's invitation. 
Carranza promoted Guajardo to general and rewarded him with 
50,000 pesos. The assassinatio~ of Zapata crushed the 
Zapatista Movement •. which never again gained strength •. The 
impact of the assassination was so great that the heart of 
the Movement had been lost. 
Zapata's assassination, however, was not the only 
assassination of a key revolutionary leader during the 
Mexican Revolution. Madero had been assassinated in 1913, 
Carranza in 1920, Villa in 1923, and Obreg6n in 1928. 
As a model of revolution, the Mexican Revol~tion 
provides the following criteria: (1) The dictatorship of 
D:!az had provided stability through loyalties of th.e army, 
the Church, the bandit chiefs, and political bosses. (2) 
The bureaucratic and military structure did not fall when 
the dictator went into exile. {3) Habits of obedience 
30 
were towards a revolutionary leader, and then to the state. 
(4) Loyalty freely given was often freely withdrawn. (5) 
Peasant revolutionary leaders like Zapata and Villa were 
frustrated by the bureaucratic an4 military structure that 
remained basically pro-hacendado. '(6) As a prolonged revolu-
tion, the Mexican Revolution was a series of revolutionary 
situations. (7) Insurgents continued to challenge the 
state as long as their aims were not recognized and as long 
as they did not recognize the legitimacy _of the pro-
hacendado state structure. (8) Only when overwhelming use 
of force was used against the insurgents did such force have 
effect. (9) The' plurality of assassinations in the Mexican 
Revolution indicates that assassination was. considered an 
effective use of incumbent power or insurgent· powero (10) 
The· hacendados propagated an anti-Zapatista myth from early 
in the Mexican Revolution in order to ensure that the 
bureaucratic and military structure would protect them. And 
(11) The price placed on Zapata's head was in effect a 
sentence of death in absentia~1 The impact of the assassina-
tion is difficult to measure, since the morale of his troops 
was low in 1919 at the time he was assassinated. 
3l-
c. The Spartacist Rebellion of 1919. 
By December 1915, the Imperial German armies were 
bogged down on the western ~ront and Germany's two top 
military leaders, General Hindenburg and General Ludendorff, 
admitted defeat. Together they convinced the Kaiser, 
Wilhelm II, that an immediate armistice and an immediate 
change in Germany's political system (a change favored by 
President Wilson of the United States) must occur. 
The major party groupings in that political system 
were: the Right, a middle group,~and the Left. The Right 
comprised the Cons~rvatives and.th~ Reichs Party (i.e., 
the Junkers, court society, and landowners); the middle 
group comprised the National Liberals (i.e., big business) 
and the Center Party {i.e., the Roman Catholics); and the 
Left comprised the Progressives (1.e., the intelligentsia 
and certain radical banking and commercial circles) and the 
strong Social Democrat Party (i.e., the party of labor and 
trade unions). 
The loyal Social Democrat- Party (SPD) remained 
supporters of the government during the war, while a small 
"International" .group -- led by Rosa :i;.,uxemburg of the 
Spartacists, i.e., a pro-marxian party -- by 1916 had 
moved out of the ranks of the loyal SPD and agitated openly 
against the war and for revolution. 
Since Prince Max von Baden was acceptable to the SPD and 
his liberal views towards labor well-knoWJ:}, he was asked to 
form a new government as the Reich Chancellor. 
Prince Max then invited Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the 
SPD to a conference, where the Prince suggested to· Ebert 
the the Kaiser might abdicate if Ebert promised to have 
the SPD, the largest party in the Re1chstag, wait before 
undertaking radical changes.·· Ebert felt duty-bound to use 
42 his leadership to save Germany. 
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Meanwhile, the conservative Right sought to establish 
a military dictatorship under a general. The Spartacists 
sought immediate radical changes, including the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. · 
On October 4, 1918, the SPD formed a coalition govern-
. ment. Prince Max forwarded a message to President Wilson 
requesting an armistice on the terms General Ludendorff 
endorsed. And by October 28, 1918, a new constitution of 
a parliamentary monarchy went into force. But the parlia-
mentary monarchy did not last long, because ·some Center 
Party members retreated from Right to Left and the transi-
tion from war to peace in the face of defeat and disintegra-
tion of the traditional legitimacy of the state was conducive 
to rebellion, which broke out in November 1918. 
On November 9, 1918, Prince Max announced the abdica-
tion of the Kaiser and he then resigned the Chancellorship. 
His natural successor was Ebert, the leader of the majority 
SPD. "Soviets" -- i.e., Workers' and Soldiers' Councils --
had gained control of most urban centers, and were in the 
process of self-creation throughout the country and at the 
front. Sailors had mutinied and civilians supported them. 
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A general strike broke out in Berlin, where large groups of 
armed workers and soldiers gathered. The Spartacists in 
Berlin encouraged the.strike and attempted to procla1~ a 
Socialist Republic, the same afternoon that Philip Scheide-
mann, Ebert's SPD cohort, had on his own initiative declared 
a Democratic Republic. Where no legitimate government 
existed, any group could proclaim that it was as legitimate 
as any other group to rule the state. 
Army officers on the streets of Berlin had their 
decorations torn off. The red flag was hoisted on public 
buildings, and hawkers suddenly wer.e everywhere selling red 
rosettes, red ribbons, and red tags. Prine~ Max, in one of 
his last acts before leaving office, persuaded the Minister 
of War, General Greener, to order his troops not to fire on 
civilians. 
Emil Eichhorn, a member of the coalition Independent 
Socialists, became the Berlin Chief of Police in the wake of 
the November Revolut.ion. Monarchy throughout Germany had 
suddenly collapsed. Imperial Germany and the old regime 
had been overthrown. And the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' 
Council formally approved Eichhorn's appointment. Later 
the Independent Socialists (a minority amongst the ~oalition 
government) favored the Left, i.e., they.became supporters 
of the Spartacist insurgency in Berlin towards the end of 
December 1918, because of the new Democratic Republic's 
suppression of a justified mutiny among sailors of the Berlin 
Naval Division. Since Eichhorn was an Independent Socialist 
and since the Independent Socialists under Georg Ledebour 
had suddenly broken with the SPD coalition, the Prussian 
government sought to dismiss him from the off ice of Berlin 
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Chief of Police. The Democratic Republic intended to ensure 
its monopoly of power over Berlin by a new appointment. The· 
Spartacists gave Eichhorn immediate support after he refused 
to comply. 
Since.both Ebert and-the Ministe~ of War, Groener, 
opposed radical changes in Germany, Ebert -- with his slogan 
of Order, Freedom, and Peace -- t~rned to General Greener, 
who could provide the most reliable armed force to bring 
law and order to Germany. Indeed, General Greener still 
controlled all field armies. The Ebert-Groener Pact was. 
formed with specific demands being made by Groener in return 
for his military assistance to the new provisional government. 
These demands included: summoning a national assembly, dis-
arming the civili~n population, and abolition of all Workers• 
and Soldiers' Councils. A secret telephone line connected 
thereafter the Reich Chancellery to the High Command's 
headquarters at S·pa. On this line Ebert and Greener were 
able to.review the situ~tion from day to day and thereby 
exploit a determined use of effective force whenever necessary. 
Ebert's first duty was to agree to the Allied armistice 
terms and to authorize Erzberger to sign them. In mid-
December the first Congress of Workers' and Soldiers• Councils 
met in-Berlin. I The SPD had no doubt by then that the Congress 
would decide in accordance with its wishes. The Congress 
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rejected an early proposal to invite Rosa Luxemburg and other 
Spartacist leaders to their deliberations. Published minutes 
of the cabinet meetings of the SPD leadership prove beyond 
question that Ebert invested a great deal of energy in 
reducing the Councils to impotence by conjuring up "an 
utterly profound threat of bolshevism. ·~ 43 The Congress soon 
endorsed the SPD pla~ for elections to a National Assembly. 
with a 400 to 50 vote. Rosa Luxemburg's ·reacted to the vote 
·by identifying the National Assembly as "a counterrevolution-
ary fortificationragainst the rev~lut1onary proletariat.•#4 
The anti-Spartacist propaganda spread by Ebert•s 
office slandered the Spartacist leadership, even sugge~ting 
that Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were lovers.45 Rosa 
was name-called "Red Rosa.n And she reacted against the 
counterrevolutionary efforts of Ebert and Groerier by demand-
ing on December 14, 1918, in the Red Flag that the entire 
adult male proletarian population be armed and that a revolu-
tionary tribunal be installed nto try the two Hohenzollerns, 
Ludendorff, Hindenburg, Tirpitz, as well as all counterrevolu-
tionaries. 1146 
The Spartacists, ejected from the seats of power, had 
no recourse but to assert themselves in acts of force against 
the incumbent government. Yet they were unable to control 
the adventurism, rioting, street fighting, looting and other 
excesses carried out by the Lumpenproletariat during. the 
months of December 1918 and January 1919. The Spartacists 
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did attempt to stop the flood qf anti-Spartacist propaganda 
1~ the press by seizing newspaper offices in Berlin. The 
incumbent government, however, held the upper hand in all 
negotiations over those offices. And Spartacist negotiators 
carrying white flags were ev~n shot at. 
The Spartacists, backed into a corner, had no choice 
but to open relations with Joffe, the Soviet ambassador in 
Berlin, who.provided them with money, leaflets, and arms. 
·The Spartacists merged with the German Communist Party and 
became known as KPD by the end of December.1918. 
The· first incidents of violei:ice between Spartacists 
and the incumbent' government was on.· December 6, 1918, when 
a posse of noncommissioned ofrioers raided the headquarters 
of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Councils and arrested 
(and in some oases executed key Spartacists) many of 
the Councils' leaders. Wels, the military commander of 
Berlin and himself a SPD, called out loyal troops and roped 
off all approaches to the inner city of Berlin. The incum-
bent government was determined to teach the Spartacists a 
lesson. 
By January 1, 1919, the Independent Socialists had 
resigned from the provisional government's coalition in 
protest to the suppression of the People's Naval Division 
in Berlin. They denounced Ebert as a lackey of the High 
Command. Gustav Noske, the Governor of Kiel during the 
November naval mutiny there and himself a SPD, became a 
member of the new provisional government's leadership. He 
volunt·eered to organize loyal troops- -- including Free Corps 
units under former officers of the Imperial Army -- to 
smash the Spartacists in Berlin. 
On January 5, 1919, the Independent Socialists and 
the KPD Spartacists published a joint manifesto denouncing 
Eichhorn's mistreatment at the hands of Ebert, Scheidemann, 
and the Prussian Ministers. Masses of workers had demon-
strated in front of Eichhorn's headquarters and he urged 
them to insurrection in an inflammatory address• Eichhorn's 
sympathies were influenced by.Joffe, who was asked to leave 
Germany by Ebert's government and who was caught with 
discriminatory leaflets in his baggage.47 The issue of 
Eichhorn's dismissal unified various Left factions, including. 
the Shop Stewards, who were in favor of revolution. Their 
joint Proclamation declared: 
Attention! Workers! Party Comrades! The Ebert- Scheide-
mann government has heightened its counterrevolutionary activi-
ties with a new contemEtible conspiracy directed against the 
revolutionary workers of Greater Berlin: it tried maliciously 
to oust Chief of Police Eichhorn from his Q&fice. It wished to 
replace Eichhorn with its willing tool •••• 
Since the crowds were large, the Left leaders felt ensured 
of mass support. But the next morning they were to discover 
that loyalty freely given can be freely withdrawn. 
If violent revolution was ever to succeed in Germany, 
Karl Liebknecht reasoned, it must be now. Rosa Luxemburg 
was reluctant and wanted to hold back. But Liebknecht went 
ahead and formed a Revolutionary Committee and called on the 
workers to rise in rebellion. 
. ; 
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By the next morning, however, the only groups.deter-
mined to take an active role in the rebellion were a small 
number of Eichhorn's personal followers, a few thousand 
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KPD Spartacists, and sections of the Independent Socialists 
and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards. The Berlin Naval 
Division had suddenly discovered its oath of loyalty to the 
incumbent government binding. By the evening of January 6, 
the revolutionary action that had begun with such passion-
ate enthusiasm was a miserable failure in terms of numbers. 
The Spartacists ought to have known that the strong 
habits of obedience of the common German civilian -- worker 
or non-worker -- were rigidly authoritarian and submissive. 
Moreover, the average German wanted only peace after years 
of war, suffering, hunger, and misery. 
Gustav Neske, the SPD Reichstag Dep~ty, sought to 
re-establish order in Berlin by first surrounding the center 
of the city and then attacking the Spartacist strong-holds. 
Berlin soon became a bloody battlefield as machine gun fire 
was exchanged. The Spartacist Rebellion lasted but seven 
days, from January 5 to January 12, 1919. The police head-
quarters was the last insurgent strong-hold to fall. 
After the arrival of the bulk of Noske's forces, a 
cleanup operation began that was aimed at disarming civilians 
by confiscating any and all unauthorized weapons. The 
Spartacist leaders became major targets as the Free Corps 
distributed leaflets to its troops calling for the elimina-
tion of all communist leaders, including Rosa Luxemburgo 49 
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These leaflets, sponsored by the incumbent government, were 
in effect a sentencing to death in absentia of Rosa Luxem-
burg.· She was finally captured and brought into the head-
quarters of one Free Corps unit in the center of Berlin and. 
struck over the head with a rifle butt. She was then carried 
to a car, shot in the head, and her body dropped from a 
bridge into a canal, where it was found weeks later. 
The Ebert government announced by the end of January 
that casualties were in excess of a thousand and that the 
Spartacist Rebellion was smashed. The assassination of 
both Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were also announced, 
but only after their movement was slandered and their pro-
Bolshevik sentiments overly .. , stressed. The obvious intent 
of such anti-insurgent propaganda was to make the assass1n-
a tions seem morally righte.ous acts. 
Philip Scheidemann in his Memoirs speaks of the 
Spartacist Rebellion as "the Bolshevist reign·of terror". 
He describes the Spartacist insurgents as "Lunatics" and 
"Russian agents": "Lunatics were let loose, and Russian 
·agents o" 51 Captain Horst von Pflugk-Hartung, who had shot 
Karl Liebknecht, took pride in ~reeing Germany of Bolshe-
vism by his act.52 There can be no doubt that the Ebert-
Scheidemann incumbent government made maximum use of the 
historical facts of Bolshevik terror and violence in Russia 
against the Spartacists. The fact that one Right wing group 
by the end of December 1918, had put a price on Rosa Luxem-
burg's head meant that hired killers would seek her out.53 
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Placing the blame of the assassination on the incumbent 
government and assessing the impact of the assassination of 
Rosa Luxemburg on the success of the Spartacist attempt to 
turn the German Revolution of 1918 into a proletarian revolu-
tion of 1919 are two issues· open to debate. Part of the 
blame must be placed on the incumbent government, which {l) 
stressed the bolshevik character of the Spart~cists, (2) 
condoned the placing· of a price on the heads of Rosa and Karl 
Liebknecht, (J) instrumentally distributed leaflets calling 
for the elimination of Spartacist.leaders, and (4) feared 
reprocussions after the assassinations. Obviously, the 
putting of a price on the head of Rosa· Luxemburg unleashed 
bands of hired killers in search of her. Full responsibi-
lity ought to be placed on the Right wing group that put up 
the money. But the incumbent government's leaflets calling 
on the elimination of Spartacist leaders such as Rosa Luxem-
burg made the incumbent leaders instrumental in providing 
the direction of its effective use of force. 
Rosa Luxemburg was a strong leader of the Spartacists. 
She was the "mind" of the Spartacist Movement.54 She had 
been an active and vocal member of the International.- Her 
critique of capitalism, The Accumulation of Capital, was 
regarded as a sequel to Karl Marx's Das Kapital. She had 
formulated the Spartacist's "demands" in her editorial in 
Red Flag, "What Does the Spartacus League Want?" And she 
had been one of the first proletarian leaders to recognize 
the role of strikes. Her loss had more than a little impact. 
CHAPrER II 
COMPARISONS 
A. Anaiysis. 
With the fall of French Emperor Napoleon III, with 
the fall of Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz, and with the 
fall of Kaiser Wilhelm II 9 the habits of obedience of the 
respective subjects weakened because of the .similar 
absoluteness of coercive power held in the hands of these 
respective rulers. As rulers with a monqpoly of power in 
their respective countries, they were able to command 
obedience and loyalty through fear and coercion. The 
· sudden fall of each ruler left an absence of charismatic 
leadership with authority to rule. The result was a degree 
of lessening of obedience to respective provisional states 
which depended on habits of obedience for its loyalty, since 
each ruler had fallen after a defeat in war that somewhat 
disintegrated its ability to use coercive weapons of force. 
Thus, the political vacuum that resulted after Napoleon III 
and most of his army were captured by the Prussians, that 
resulted after Don Porfirio abdicated and left for exile in 
Europe, and that resulted after the Kaiser had gone into 
exile in Holland left each respective country without a 
legitimate ruler with legitimate authority to rule the state. 
Thus, socio-political change ·depended on new loyalties. 
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Defeat in war left the French army in 1870 and the 
German army in 1918 disintegrated, while the defeat in war 
at the battle of Juarez did not disintegrate the Mexican 
army• Ho~ever, the habits of obedience of Mexicans ·were· 
not as much towards the state after D!az went into exile 
as loyalties were towards individual revolutionary person-
ali tes, such as Zapata and Villa. The elections to the 
National Assembly in France split the loyalties between 
monarchists.:-favoring peace with Prussia and republicans 
in urban centers seeking a Republic rather an an Empire. 
And the collapse of the German army in World War I left 
Germany in the hands of the Social Democrats, who favored 
a monarchy and who needed the support of the Imperial ar~y 
to maintain law and order. Because of the strong habits of 
obedience of the German military, Germans generally were · 
obedient to the will of the· state, regardless of whether 
it was legitimate in commanding that obedience. 
The absence of a strong ruler in each respective state 
meant that whatever habits of obedience were present in the 
general population would be lessened as a result of the 
socio-political vacuum and the lack of a state with any 
legitimacy of authority to command obedience. In such a 
transitional vacuum arose revoluti'onary personalities with 
autonomous wills. Such personalities questioned the legiti~ 
macy of the provisional government's authority to govern. 
And these insurgent personalities found followers who were 
suddenly free to switch loyalties, since loyalty freely 
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given can be freely withdrawn. 
Since the state lacked a monopoly of power,, suddenly 
it found that it could not command obedience, 1.e., use 
coercive power to intimidate. Without fear, the insurgent 
·rorces grew with the switching of loyalties. But in the 
case of the Mexican Revolution loyalties were often to the 
bandit leader, if a member of a band of bandits, or to the 
hacendados, if a member of a hacienda, or to the village 
leader, if a member of a peasant vi~lage. Since the army 
was not disintegrated by one battle, the Zapatistas of the 
peasant villages of the state of Morelos found themselves 
faced with federal troops seeking to disperse them. The 
provisional President of Mexico, De la Barra, appointed 
Carreon, a pro-hacendado manager of the Bank of Morelos·, to 
the office of provisional Governor of Morelos, Zapata had· 
· reason to demand both political and agrarian reforms of 
Madero, the revolutionary leader predisposed to reforms but 
unable to command the obedience of the D!az bureaucracy, 
which D!az had left essentially intact. Thus, Zapatistas 
remained loyal to Zapata and Villistas to Villa. 
Of the three abortive revolutions, only the Mexican 
Revolution was a case where the military remained basically 
intact. That the Paris Commune of 1871 could ~ot have stood 
a chance against the full military might of Napoleon III and 
that the Berlin Commune of the Spartacists of 1919 could not 
have stood a chance against the full military might of the 
Kaiser tends to place the stre.ss on the opportunity for 
insurrection that opened up after the collapse of that 
military might in the respective cases. The rise of 
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charismatic revolutionary personalities -- such as Flourens 
and Rosa Luxemburg -- with th~ natural propensity to be 
autonomous and to question the legitimacy of authority of 
any provisional government corresponded with the rise 1n 
opportunities for 1nsur.rection. · The switching of loyalties 
freely given and freel.Y withdrawn was natural in the 
respective transitions. And the loyalty given Flourens 
so freely before the sortie against, Versailles soon faded 
after the first shots, just as the loyalty given Luxemburg 
(not to mention Liebknecht) during the rallies in Berlin 
soon faded by the time Noske's forces surrounded Berlin. 
Suddenly, the Naval Division found that it ought to remain 
loyal to the provisional government, as did many of the 
Germ.an workers -- the masses of proletarians who the Sparta-
! 
! · cists had counted on for support -- by the next morning 
I 
. 
when they had time to consider whether they were for peac~ 
freedom-order, i.e., the themes of Ebert's government~5 
Establishing the legitimacy of authority of a new 
incumbent state is as difficult as a given revol~tionary 
personality has in establishing his right to lead. Much 
depends on the strength of incumbent leaders to lead and 
on their effective use of force against insurgent leaders. 
The presumption behind assassination plots against the 
stronger insurgent leaders is that their elimination will 
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effectively control revolutionary situations. The final 
- ' 
decision of incumbent leadership to assassination or to 
eliminate those insurgent leaders is usually correlative 
to the presumption that that decision would bring the 
predicted results, i.e., control of change. Indeed, the 
incumbent wants control of change in order to protect itself 
from insurrection, while the insurgent wants control of 
change in order to overthrow the state. 
I 
By use of assassination the incumbent wants a 
maximum amount of control of change and at the same time 
wants a maximum.amount of uncontrol of change among the 
insurgent forces: i.e., the elimination of an insurgent 
leader with strong loyalties of his followers presumes that 
the degree of control over the revolutionary situation he 
possessed will thereafter be uncontrolled. New leaders 
with mixed loyalties of followers -- some freely given 
and some freely withdrawn soon thereafter.-- will have to 
struggle for leadership of the insurgent movement. Such 
presumption must have been foreseen by plotters among the 
incumbent elite who sought the maximum amount of impact on 
the insurgents by the most effective use of force. 
Analysis of the descriptive content of the three 
abortive revolution~· indicates that the three provisional 
governments used coercive force both effectively and deter-
minately. Thiers used coercive force to massacre 20,000 
Communards. Carranza -- after.De la Barra, Madero, and 
Huerta failed -- succeeded in using coercive force against 
the Zapatista insurgents and reduced their forces from 
70,000 in 1915 to only 10,000 by 1919. And the provisional 
government under Ebert used coercive force to ·kill about 
a thousand pro-Spartacist rebels~ 
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Analysis also indicate~ that the respective incumbent 
governments sought the elimination of key insurgent leaders •. 
The Versailles government's military court sentenced Flourens 
to death in-absentia. Carranza placed a reward on the head 
of Zapata, which in effect sentenced Zapata to death in 
absentia. And Noske's troops distributed leaflets calling 
:for the elimination:.·o:f Rosa Luxemb-q.rg, which was in effect 
sentencing her to death in absentia. 
After the assassination of these key insurgent· leaders, 
the propagation of an anti-insurgent myth was needed to give 
moral justification for the self-rigtheousness of these 
assassinations and the death of so many insurgents. The 
anti-Zapatista myth began early in the state of Morelos· 
where pro-hacendado news accounts fabricated 
Zapatista deprecations. The anti-Cornmunard myth. propagated 
by Thiers began with the accusation of National Guardsmen 
for the deaths of two government officers following orders. 
And the ant1-Spartac1st myth propagated by Ebert and pro~ 
incumbent newspapers -- many of them taken over by the 
Spartacists in Berlin in order to stop the anti-Bolshevik 
slander of key Spartacist leaders -- began during the war 
when both Luxemburg and Liebknecht were jailed for protest-
ing the war, and name-calling later, e.g., "Red Rosa." 
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B. Conceptual Scheme. 
1. An Explicit Conceptual Framework. The comparative 
study of revolutions can either draw from the tradition of 
similar studies (e.g., Crane Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution) 
or seek an original path. This thesis has followed the 
traditional path because the reader is more apt to be familiar 
with it. The nee~. for a Conceptual Scheme such as Crane 
Brinton provided is also stressed by Peter.Amann: 
Me:x-ely ttreliving11 the chaos "as it really was" is 
unlikely to provide such an understanding (i.e., "a rational 
understanding of the dynamics of a revolution"). Actually. 
though the advocates of Rankean detachment also want to draw 
conclusions and discover patterns, they feel that they can 
do this without bringing to their study any conceptual 
apparatus at all--merely a healthy curiosity and the canons 
by which they were trained. I believe that they are deceiv-
ing themselves. The real alternative lies between a concep-
tual framework which is never made explicit and therefore 
remains beyond the rea~ of· criticism, and one which is open 
to critical inspection. 
Brinton sought scientific "detachment" b:ut also provided an 
explicit Conceptual Scheme based on facts drawn from em-
pirical phenomena to support hypothese~ of first approxima-
tions of uniformities. 
In the next sections an explicit conceptual framework 
I 
i . 
will ble11d the notion of "habits of obedience"· in Am.arm's 
"redefinition". of revolu·tion with the notion of the distinc-
tion between autonomy and authority in Robert Paul Wolff's 
In Defense of Anarchism. Hopefully, such a blend will. 
provide the sort of general identification of the moral 
state of mind common to the.revolutionary personalityi i.e., 
the "revolutionary personality" can have a moral basis. 
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2. The Revolutionari Personalitio The conception of 
the autonomous individual -- i.e., one who rejects all 
authority as illeg1timate5~- ought to be of more than a 
little historical interest to the student of revolution. 
Doing what one is told to do-because another tells him is 
not the basis for a rational moral foundation. Some claims 
of authority, such as the robber's, may be morally wrong. 
For example·, if a robber holds you at gunpoint and says 
"What is yours is mine," he has power over you, but hardly 
authority over you.59 
, 
Men generally acknowledge claims of authority because 
of the force of tradition. But tradition to the revolution-
ary personality is usually an inadequate. reason to obey. Yet 
there does not exist a rational basis for legitimate authority 
outside tradition. 
Analysis of the three abortive revolutions indicate 
that strong rulers -- Napoleon III, D!az, and Kaiser Wilhelm 
II -- fell. just before the revolutions took place. Habits 
of obedience determine how that transition effected each 
respective state. If the habits of obedience are strong (as 
in the case of the Germans), then the transition is smooth. 
But if the habits of obedience are weak (as in the case of 
the Mexicans), then the transition is· roughc Indeed, after· 
a strong ruler has fallen, generally only another strong 
ruler can take his place, 1.e., if a ruler must be strong to 
command obedience in a given state. The disintegrati_on of 
the respective armies after defeat in war also weakens the 
I 
!· 
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coercive force available to the respective strong rulers and 
of course to the surrogate rulers who:replace them. When the 
surrogate ruler replaces a strong ruler, a momentary break• 
down of the state's monopoly of power is likely to occur, 
because the autonomous revolutionary personality -- who 
rejects all claims to legitimate authority and would not 
believe such a claim if it were made by a surrogate ruler 
capitalizes on "a lessening of the habit of obedience" that 
naturally arises during such transitional transfers of power. 
Autonomous insurgent leaders -- such as Flourens, 
' Zapata, and Luxemburg -- called into question the legitimacy 
of the respective incumbent governments led by surrogate rulers. 
In other words, they challenged the new rulers, who lacked a 
monopoly of power, who lacked unquestioned obedience, and who 
lacked legitimacy of authority (at least in the eyes of the 
autonomous insurgent leaders). · As Peter Amann points out, 
Obedience based on loyalty independent of habit or fear 
is, as Machiavelli saw, an insecure basis of gtate power. 
Loyalty freely given may be freely withdrawn. 0 
The lack of strong loyalties to a given surrogate incumbent 
ruler lessens the habits of obedience to the state. As Amann 
maintains, "the power monopoly of the state depends largely ••• 
on their (i.e., the governed) habits of obedience": 
It is the habit of obedience that, extended to institu-
tions like the army and the:.:bureaucracy, makes it possible for 
the state to delegate vital functions without jeopardizing its 
own effective monopoly of military, judicial and administra-
tive power.61 
The strong habits of obedience, _f9r example, of the Germans 
made such power responsible and obedient to Ebert himself. 
I. 
i 
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J. A "Redefinition" of Revolution. If the term "revo-
lution" is a semantic device, then the pragmatics of what is 
the best available definition to use within a conceptual 
scheme will determine appropriateness. Neither Brinton's 
common usage, nor Hobsbawm's vacuous open-ended definition 
of revolutionary situation, are adequate. Brinton's defini-
tion is too broad, while Hobsbawm•s definition depends on 
a definition of "success" and "good chances of a revoluti·on-
ary outcome." And the "circular motion" of the Copernican 
idea of revolution in the astronomic sense is inadequate. 
Peter Amann proposes ~o "redefine .. the term as "a 
breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of 
power, usually acco~panied by a lessening of the habit of 
o~edience." The revolution lasts until· the state's monopoly 
of power is se.riously challenged by one or more "power blocs." 
And it ends when either the incumbent leadership or the in-
surgent leadership is victorious. In other words, the insur-
gent forces succeed in establishing state power or its equi-
valent as in the case of a successful revolution, or the in-
cumbent forces smash the insurgent forces as in the case of 
an abortive revolution. 
The selection of a definition appropriate to abortive 
revolutions must include the possibility of a "momentary" 
breakdown of the state's monopoly of power. Though the Paris 
Commune and the Spartacist Rebellion were in both cases smash-
ed within a week of bloody street fighting, a week must be 
considered to be a momentary existence ·of revolution. 
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4. Historical Fallacies. No broad, general claims are 
made in this thesis, which aims only at primarily seeking 
tentative uniformities through comparative analysis of three 
revolutions and at secondarily refuting four general claims. 
The three abortive revolutions, for example, suggest that the 
general claim that all successful revolutions are inevitable 
is unhistoric and that the general claim that all successful 
revolutions are uncontrollable is self-contradictory. If, 
as Hobsbawm maintains, the term "revolution" can only be 
defined in terms of "success," -- a term which he himself. 
leaves open -- then abortive revolutions are not revolutions 
at all. Are abortive revolutions merely "revolutionary situ-
ations"? A _revolutionary situation, Hobsbawm says, is a 
short-term or long-term crisis with the possibilities of a 
revolutionary outcome. He implies by revolutionary outcome 
-- if failure can _only be defined in terms of success -- a 
successful revolutionary outcome. And by success he seems 
to seek something more than merely the establishment of state 
power or its equivalent. Obviously, abortive revolutions do 
come within the scope of his classification of revolutionary 
situation. But it is arbitrary to ignore abortive revolu-
tions when he claims that this is the epoch of only success-
ful revolutions. Hobsbawm has made a fallacy of semantical 
distortion in his argument, or a fallacy of composition in 
his explanation, or perhaps both, when he makes such general 
claims of such a universal, unlimited nature that any ~iven 
abortive revolution is adequate to refute them. 
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The semantic distortion in Hobsbawm•s. use of the term 
"revolution" might be due to the use onty of the great 
successful revolutions as models, which in turn provide the 
criteria to classi:fy all such events. But such a.··great 
successful revolution as the Prench Revolution fails to 
provide the ultimate criteria for defining the term. It 
fails because (1) historians draw upon enough possible 
factors as the cau.se that entirely different sets of causes 
have been given; (2) historians.disagree as to whether it 
was one or more revolutions, e.g., the Revolution.of the 
Aristocracy, the .Revolution of the Third Estate, -the Demo-
er.a.tic and Republican Revolution of August 10, 1792, the 
Social Democratic Revolution of June 2, 1793, and the Babeuf 
Revolution during the Directory; and (3) historians disagree 
on when it ended, one group (Mathiez, Tho~pson, Goodwin) 
claim the French Revolution ended in 1794, while another 
group (Lefebvre, Soboul, Richet) claim it ended in 1799.62 
In terms of su.ccess even an abortive· revol_ution can 
later have consequences leading to success~ as Brinton point_s 
out: 
The abortive revolution is especially important in the 
welding together of oppressed nationalities, which after a 
few heroic uprisings attain a pitch of exalted patriotism and 
self-pity that makes them almost unbeatable.63 
The term "revolution" means more than just "chan.ge,u as even 
Hobsbawm implies when he criticizes two definitions of the 
term with only the term "change" in common.64 Moreover; he. 
~ays· 11 analysis is not predictive 11 65 but that revolutions are 
11 1n1t1ally" more "uncontrollable, 11 66 which ls predictive. 
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c. Thesis Argument. 
1. Refutation of "little" Historical Interest Claim •. 
Eric Hobsbawm claims that all approaches seeking to identify 
revolutionary personality are of little historical interest. 
By explicitly rejecting the need.to identify revolutionary 
personality, he has self-refuted his claim, because he has 
indeed shown more than a little interest in claiming all such 
approaches wrong. As.a historian, he either· can present· 
adequate evidence to·· warrant his cl.aim, or he cannot. I:f he 
cannot, then his claim lacks support and can therefore be 
discounted as not a claim at all. An unsupported claim is 
not a strong objection to all such identification approaches. 
For Hobsbawm to be persuasive, he must support his 
claim. By supporting it, he self-refutingly shows more than 
a little historical interest in identifying revolutionary 
personality. Thus, his approach becomes a kindred approach.· 
Categorically, his approach (i.e., supporting with more than 
a little interest the rejection of all approaches that seek 
to identify revolutionary personality) is nevertheless an 
approach to revolutionary personality. He refutes himself: 
All approaches are wrong. 
Hobsba.wm• s approach is such an approach. 
Therefore, Hobsbawm's approach is wrong. 
Since he rejects revolutionary personality as being of little 
historical interest, he must have good reason. Marxism ls 
often considered to be a repudiation of the role and signifi-
cance of the individual in social development, although Marx 
himself was a humanist, 1.e., man was not nameless and.impersonal. 
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2. Refutation of the claim that revolutions are both 
uncontrollable and inevitable. Hobsbawm contradicts himself 
by maintaining that "some revolutions are avoidable, if 
avoided, 11 67 and at the same time claiming that revolutions 
-- i.e., successful revolutions -- are both uncontrollable 
and inevitable. For example, 
All revolutions are unavoidable. 
Some revolutions are not avoidable, 
i.e., some revolutions are avoidable. 
The semantic difference between "unavoidable" and both 
uncontrollable and inevitable is significant only insofar 
as any use of eff·ective force by an incumbent government to 
protect itself from revolution aims at avoiding revolution. 
During a revolution an incumbent government either controls 
or not controls the revolutionary situation. If the incum-
bent controls it, then the revolution fails. Any of the 
three abortive revolutions provides inductive support to 
support the qualified suggestion that some revolutions are 
controlled. And, similarly, an incumbent government that 
succeeds in controlling a revolution by smashing the insur-
gent forces avoids, at least momentarily, what chances the 
revolutionary situation had of becoming successful. At- that 
f 
point in time the historian would be unhistoric to make any 
claims concerning the inevitability of a predicted outcome. 
Either a revolution is inevitable in time or it is not. It 
would be therefore unhistoric to predict a successful out-
come of revolution before, during, or momentarily after an 
abortive revolution. Inevitability is unhistoric in time. 
1 · 
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3. Refutation of "Epoch of Social Revolutionn Claim. 
That some revo.lutions are successful and that some revolu-
tions :fail cannot be denied·. The existence of revolutions 
in modern times cannot be denied. Indeed, the existence of 
revolutions in history provided the basis for the primary 
comparative study of the 'uniformity of three revolutions 
that failed. But it is unhistoric to generalize about the 
. future by claiming that all social revolutions are unavoid-
able, uncontrollable, and inevitable. Hobsbawm contradicts 
himself by making such universal claims of m~dern history: 
No social revolution is avoidable (1.e., all social 
revolutions are unavoidable) is contradicted by the fact 
that some social revolutions are avoidable. 
Success is avoidable. Unfortunately, success is not 
inevitable in the affairs of man. Indeed, success cannot 
always be controlled. Moreover, what happened yesterday 
might not happen again. Perhaps modern history up to now 
has been an epoch of social revolution, but it would be 
unhistori·c to predict the future will be like the past. 
Three abortive revolutions inductively refute the 
universal claim that no social revolution is avoidable (i.e., 
controllable and not· inevitable). Indeed, the three abortive 
revolutions tentatively suggest that this is the epoch of 
abortive social revolutions. 
._, 
As models, abortive revolu-
tions provide the criteria or understanding necessary to 
protect ourselves from successful revolutions tomorrow. 
4. Summ~ry of Secondary Argum~nt.· The secondary pur-
pose of this thesis was to refute Hobsbawm's four claims. 
These arguments of refutation do not aim to be conclusive. 
However, the understanding of how to protect ourselves fr?m 
revolutions -- i.e., the sor~ of understanding that Brinton 
sought -- may be better found in abortive revolutions than in 
successful revolutions. In the four revolutions that Brinton 
studied, the respective incumbent governments failed to use 
determined effective force against the insurgent forces. In 
the three abortive revolutions studied in this thesis, the 
respective incumbent governments succeeded in using effective 
force to smash the insurgent forces. Hence, two distinc·t 
types of models of revolutions can be focused upon: the 
.abortive revolution model and the successful revolution model. 
68 Hoosbawm's four claims depend on models that succeed, if 
he claims that the inevitability and the uncontrollability of 
revolutions are universal. But inevitability. of revolution 
is found only after a successful revolution and uncontrollabil-
ity ls found during a successful revolution, if at all •. Some 
revolutions are avoided, controlled, and thus were not. inevi-
table. Abortive revolutions were controlled by the effective 
use .of force by the incumbent governments in the· cases studied. 
From the study of abortive revolutions alone, one might 
suggest that this is an epoch of abortive revolutions and 
not an epoch solely of successful revolutions. If abortive 
revolutions become universal in the future, perhaps it will 
be so because of understanding derived from abortive models. 
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5. Assassination. Historians who consider history as 
biography find_ great interest in the personalities of 
1. Archduke Ferdinan~ 7. Leon Trotsky 
2. Lincoln 8. Gandhi ,, 
J. JFK 9. Rasputin°9 
4. Malcolm X 10. Rosa Luxemburg 
5. Rev. Luther King Jr. 11. Emiliano Zapata 
6. Dr. Marat 12. Gustave Flourens 
These individuals are not nameless and impersonal. Each 
was murdered. And some were without a doubt political 
murders, i.e., assassinations. Hence, interest in assassina-
tions has more than a little relevance to historians and to 
historical biographers. 
In some abortive revolutions the incumbent government 
uses effective force to smash the insurgents. A part of the 
effective force used may be the use of .assassination of key 
insurgent leaders. In each of the abortive revolutions 
studied, the incumbent government used assass~nation as part 
of the effective force to smash the insurgents. In each 
case evidence indicates.that the incumbent government sought 
to eliminate key insurgent leader. Such evidence, h~wever, 
provides only a possible.causal link between motivation and 
assassination. Such a link can also be regarded as a moral 
one between cause and effect. 
In comparatiy~.historlcal. study some factual evidence may 
answer the question, ''How did it happen?" The moral implica-
tions of such an answer sometimes answers the moral question, 
"Who is to blame?.. The two different questions seem to merge 
and demand a single answer. 
6. The Fallacy of Responsibility as Cause. Various 
historical fallacies must be avoided. One such fallacy is 
the fallacy of responsib~lity as cause, which occurs when 
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the causal question, "How did it happen?" seems to-:-have the 
same answer as the moral question, 11 Who is to blame?'' When 
these two different questions are merged and seem to demand 
one answer, the fallacy is said to occur. Is it not post 
hoc? It is not a post hoc fallacy to tie the causal evidence 
of the incumbent government to eliminate the insurgent leaders 
in each case, because such evidence is. tied to the evidence 
of the effect, 1.e., the key insurgent leaders in each case 
were eliminated by assassination. Of course, one event is not 
the cause of another event merely because it comes in temporal 
succession before the other. These key leaders were elimin-
ated. Who was to blame? The moral question must remain 
unanswered. But the causal question has been answered. 
Suggestions, not claims, are tentatively put forward 
in this thesis as. inductive generalizations limited by the 
scope of the study, which is to three abortive revolutions. 
Another fallacy, the fallacy of the single case, is therefore 
avoided. when it is suggested that no claims are here made, 
such a statement, if made, ought not be taken as an insidious 
claim. Of course, over-generalizations that go beyond the 
inductive generalizations within the scope of the study must 
be considered unjustifiable, as over-generalization tends 
to distort the tentativeness and the limitations of scope of 
the inductively limited uniformities the study supports. 
,. 
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J_. Summarz of Argument. Just as it is difficult tJO 
assess the impact of assassination of a given leader on the 
controllability of a given revolutionary situation by the 
incumbent state, so is it difficult to identify whether a 
given revolutionary personality -- such as Gustave Flourens 
-- had a high degree of control over the Paris.Commune. He 
does provide an example of the sort of insurgent leader the 
historian would have to identify and to assess. If one 
revolutionary personality proves the point that identifica-
tion is of more than a little historical interest, the 
example of Flourens will serve to prove the point. 
The fact that marxists have found the Paris Commune to 
be the best model for the establishment of proletarian power 
allows us here to use Flourens as the best example • 
. The assumption that the Versailles• incumbent govern-
ment was motivated by the "presumption., that the ·assassina-
tion of Flourens would effectively protect the state must 
be considered self-confirming, because the assassination 
took place with the aim of controlling the revolutionary 
situation. To attempt to provide evidence pro or con to 
this assumption would only confirm the counter-claim that 
the approach seeking to identify revolutionary personality 
has more than a little histor1ca1 interest. 
If successful revolutions have been avoided (e.g., 
controlled by assassination of insurgent leade~s), _then 
·revolutionary situations are controllable and. successful 
revolutions are not inevitable. 
1 
\ 
I 
CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing_argument is supported by the analysis 
and comparison of descriptiye historical evidence to warrant 
nine approximations of uniformities: {l) the presence of ha-
bits of obedience to a strong ruler, (2) who fell after de-
feat in war, and (J) a lessening of habits of obedience towards 
the surrogate incumbent government ensued among insurgents; (4) 
lessening of habits of obedience towards the incumbent govern-
ment meant that autonomous leaders, who naturally questioned 
the legitimacy of any state, would find followers; (5) the 
incumbent government assumed that these insurgent leaders were 
a threat to their monopoly of power, authority, or legitimacy, 
as is indicated by a determined attempt by each incumbent govern-
ment to eliminate key insurgent leaders, who (6) generally held 
the loyalties -- at least temporarily -- of their respective 
insurgent followers; (7) the effective use of determined force 
by each incumbent government included (8) the presumption that 
elimination of key insurgent leaders was necessary; and (9) an 
anti-insurgent myth was needed by the victorious incumbent state 
power to give moral justification for the righteousness of the 
act of assassination as well as the overwhelming use of force 
in smashing the insurgent forces in bloody encounter. Finding 
these tentative uniformities from inductive evidence was the 
primary purpose of this thesis. Since the study involves a 
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comparative analysis of revolution, a conceptual scheme that 
stressed the need for identification of revolutionary person-
ality and the need for a ••redefinition" of revolution was 
developed utilizing a ble,nd of Wolff·•.s distinction between 
autonomy and a~thority and of Amann's redeftn1t1on of revolu-
tion in terms of loyalty and habits of obedience. The revolu-
tionary personality was identifiable in each of the three 
abortive revolutions •. The presumptive decision to assassin-
ate the insurgent leaders entails that the incumbent's plot 
was based on predictive posslbili~y that elimination of an 
identifiable revolutionary personality would have an impact 
on the insurgent's morale and a weakening·of insurgent's 
habits of obedience to new leadership. The possibility o~ a 
leadership struggle among insurgents would weaken their threat 
to the incumbent government. In order to analyze whether 
assassination had an impact involves the identification of 
such revolutionary personalities, which become more than of 
little interest to historians of revolutions. 
The revolutionary personality is one who ~oes not find 
any claim to legitimate authority persuasive and who would 
not believe such a claim if it were made. Such an autono-
. mous individual is in direct conflict with whatever state 
seeks to impose its will, i.e., demand obedience and use 
coercive force if commands are not obeyed. 
The redefinition of revolution in terms of fear, 
loyalty, and habits of obedience blends well with the 
conceptual apparatus used in the analysis of the three 
I 
~ . 
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abortive revolutions, which prove that revolutionary person-
al1ty is of more than a little historical interest and that 
revolutionary situations are controllable (if determined 
use of effective coercive force is unleashed by the incum~ 
bent.) All future-bound claims tend to be unhistoric, in-
cluding the suggestion that analysis of revolutionary situ-
ations is not predictive. To suggest that it is not pre-
dictive is to suggest that it would be historic if it were 
possible to predict future possibilities. But future possi-
bilities are not history (i.e., of. the past) and there'f'o.re 
can be discounted as unhistoric, just as· the notion that 
all revolutionary situations -- initially or otherwise --
can always be contro·lled. Some are controlled and some are 
not controlled. Some are avoided, as Hobsbawm grants, while 
some are not avoided. 
Hobsbawm ties "success" into his notion of "revolution," 
which allows for a refutation of his claim that "revolutions 
are inevitable" and his correlative claim that "this is an 
epoch of social revolution." Successful ·revolutions are not 
inevitable, any more than abortive revolutions are inevitable. 
This is the epoch of successful revolutions as much as it is 
the epoch of abortive revolutions. The analysis of the three 
abortive revolutions tends to show that revolutions can·be 
controlled by the effective use of force, which can be deci-
sive. Few historians would question th~t socia~political 
change is inevitable. Incumbent elites who plot assassina-
tion presume that eliminating key leaders will control~hange. 
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